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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution of Utah, 
section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code (1953, as amended), and 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion 
for Directed Verdict? 
3. Did the jury err in finding that plaintiff's refusal to 
accept an application for residency from Jackie Southworth was 
not an "unreasonable withholding" of approval for residency 
within the meaning of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code? 
4. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's Motion 
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs. 
5. Did the trial court err in denying defendants' Motion 
for Costs and Attorney's Fees? 
Standards of Review 
Issue ttl: A trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion for reconsideration is within the trial court's 
1 
discretion, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial 
court's ruling absent an "abuse of discretion." See Lund v. 
Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997)(motion to reconsider summary 
judgment) (citation omitted); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 
1386 (Utah 1996)(motion to reconsider summary judgment) 
(citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion if 
there is "no reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
In determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion, the appellate court will review the entire record. 
See, e.g., J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 11 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (looking to entire record to determine 
whether defendant's motion for reconsideration was properly 
before trial court); Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 
650, 655 (Utah 1994) (deferring to entire record, which included 
plaintiffs' complaint and affidavits supporting their motion for 
reconsideration). Thus, even if the motion for reconsideration 
provides inadequate justification for upholding the trial court's 
ruling, the ruling will be upheld if the record provides a 
"reasonable basis" for doing so. 
The trial court has "a great deal of latitude in determining 
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business." 
2 
Morton v, Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997). 
Absent a trial court ruling that is "so unreasonable that it can 
f 
be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of 
discretion,'' an appellate court will not reverse the ruling. 
Kunzler v. Q'Dell,855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted); see also Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)(applying "abuse of discretion standard")(footnote & 
citation omitted). 
Issue #2: The standard of review on appeal from a motion for 
directed verdict is "correctness." Management Comm. of Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 
897-98 (Utah 1982) . 
Issue #3: In reviewing a jury verdict, "[the appellate 
court] view[s] the evidence in the light most supportive of the 
verdict, and assume[s] that the jury believed those aspects of 
the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." Billings 
v. Union Rankers, Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) 
(internal quotations & citation omitted) . In so doing, "the 
[appellate court] will upset a jury verdict only upon a showing 
that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome 
of the case." Id. (Internal quotations & citations omitted); &££ 
also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 
3 
1982)(stating that appellate court should uphold jury verdict 
unless jury's finding is "so plainly unreasonable as to convince 
the court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
[such a] finding.") (Citation omitted); see generally, Ortiz v. 
Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (discussing standard of review for overturning a jury 
verdict) . 
Issue #4 and #5: An appellate court reviews a trial court's 
conclusions of law for "correctness." See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (stating that "appellate review of a 
trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized 
by the term 'correctness.'"). 
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR REVIEW QN APPEAL 
Issue #1, #2 and #4: Plaintiff now appears to make a claim 
for ill attorney's fees incurred in defending against the 
Counterclaim.1 Plaintiff did not preserve this issue for appeal 
since, in its Motion for Allowance of Attorney's fees and Costs, 
plaintiff only sought attorney's fees for defending against 
certain portions of the Counterclaim. (R. at 1103, 1148.) 
xSee Brief of Appellant at 23, Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 14, 2000) 
(stating that "Brookside is entitled to its court cost and 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this action because 
without exception, each and every one of the claims pursued by 
Peebles at trial were based upon the Peebles' allegations that 
Brookside violated the Utah Mobile Home Residency Act."). 
4 
Issue #3 and tt5: Defendants preserved their right to appeal 
the jury verdict by presenting their counterclaim to the jury. 
(Trial Transcript [hereinafter "T"] at 284-721.) When the court 
reduced the jury verdict to a Judgment on May 26, 19 99, that 
judgment became a final judgment subject to appeal. (R. at 12 97-
99.) Defendants preserved the right to appeal their Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs at the time it was filed. (R. 
1161-1162.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") is a mobile 
home park located at 8155 South 1700 West, West Jordan, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. (R. at 1-2.) 
2. In 1983, Sam Peebles purchased a double-wide mobile 
home (the "Mobile Home") that was located on space #100 within 
the Park. (T. at 400.) 
3. Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles are listed on the title 
as the owners of the Mobile Home. (T. at 400; Exhibit D-71, 
attached hereto as Appendice A.) 
4. Citicorp Acceptance Company, Inc. ("Citicorp") financed 
the purchase of the Mobile Home, and is listed as the 
"Lienholder" on the title to the Mobile Home. (T. at 400-01; 
Exhibit D-71, attached hereto as Appendice A.) 
5. Harold Peebles is Sam Peebles' father, and he co-signed 
5 
on the loan with Citicorp. (T. at 400-01.) 
6. At the time he purchased the Mobile Home, Sam Peebles 
signed a written lease with the owner of the Park. (T. at 402.) 
7. From approximately 1983 until approximately 1987, Sam 
Peebles and his wife and children resided in the Mobile Home. 
(T. at 175. ) 
8. After Sam Peebles moved out, he sold the Mobile Home on 
an installment contract to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock. (T. at 
175-456. ) 
9. After about six months, Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock 
defaulted on the contract and Sam Peebles retook possession of 
the Mobile Home. (T. at 403.) 
10. After retaking possession of the Mobile Home, Sam 
Peebles signed a second lease with the owner of the Park. (T. at 
403 . ) 
11. Thereafter, Sam Peebles subleased the Mobile Home to a 
series of sublessees, including Yolanda Gonzales, Tim and Kathy 
Burgess, and Richard and LaDawn Rowley.2 (T. at 189, 411-12.) 
2Plaintiff's representation that "Peebles . . . sold the 
home to Richard Rowley" is incorrect. Brief of Appellant at 6, 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. 
App. filed Feb. 14, 2000). Sam Peebles subleased the Mobile Home 
to Richard Rowley. See Q: "[D] id you have an arrangement 
[with Richard Rowley]?" Sam Peebles: "He just rented it." (T. 
at 183, line 22-23.) Q: "Did you ever sell the Mobile Home to 
Richard Rowley?" Sam Peebles: "No I didn't." (T. at 412, line 8-
10.) Q: "Did you sell your home to Richard Rowley?" Sam 
6 
12. On or about December 9, 1994, the Park was sold to the 
Alan H. Glover & Bonnie A. Glover Revocable Trust (the "Trust") 
which subsequently transferred its interest to Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside"). (T. at 34-35, 40-41.) 
13. In connection with the sale, the Trust entered into an 
Assignment of Lease and Deposits, dated December 9, 1994 (the 
"Assignment"). (T. at 34-35; Appendice B, attached hereto.) 
14. Under that Assignment, the previous owner of the Park 
transferred to the Trust "all of its right, title and interest in 
and to" "those certain leases [and] rental agreements appurtenant 
to the property." (R. at 469; Appendice B, attached hereto.) 
15. The Assignment did not list the specific leases or 
rental agreement that were transferred under the Assignment. (R. 
at 469-476; Appendice B, attached hereto.) 
16. Exhibit "B" to the Assignment listed -the "residents" 
for the Park, and showed "Rowley" as the "resident" for space 
#100. (R. at 474. Appendice B, attached hereto.) 
17. On or about April 1, 1995, Richard Rowley entered into 
a Rental Agreement with Brookside for space #100 in the Park. 
(T. at 82.) 
Peebles: "No, I did not." Q: "Were the Rowleys' paying rent for 
the privilege of living in your home?" Sam Peebles: "Yes, they 
were." (T. 189, Line 3-7.)(See also the discussion on page 411, 
line 4 through page 412, line 10.) 
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18. In September or October 1995, Richard Rowley abandoned 
the Mobile Home, leaving back rent owing to the Park. (R. at 
413 . ) 
19. In October, 1995, the Park manager contacted Sam 
Peebles and demanded that he bring current the rent on space 
#100. (R. at 413-14.) 
20. On October 31, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $591.00 to 
Brookside for rent on space #100, which included back rent owed 
by Richard Rowley. (T. at 413-14; 189; Exhibit D-72, attached 
hereto as Appendice C.) 
21. After Richard Rowley moved out, Sam Peebles decided to 
fix up the Mobile Home and sell it in the Park. (T. at 418-19.) 
22. During November and December, 1995, Sam Peebles began 
making repairs on the Mobile Home. (R. at 421-22.) 
23. On or about December 10, 1995, Sam Peebles entered into 
a Real Estate Purchase Contract to sell the Mobile Home to Jake 
Grider. (T. at 287.) 
24. Jake Grider had been approved for a loan by Washington 
Mutual to purchase the Mobile Home. (T. at 287.) 
25. Brookside denied Jake Grider's application for 
residency. (T. at 288.) 
26. Several weeks later, Jake Grider purchased another 
mobile home and was approved for residency at Meadowbrook Mobile 
8 
Home Park. (T. at 289-90.) 
27. On or about December 11, 1995, Brookside served Sam 
Peebles with a "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit," demanding payment of 
$215.00 for "rent now due and owing for the month of December," 
and providing that failure to pay "may result in immediate 
termination of your lease." (Exhibit D-83, attached hereto as 
Appendice D.) 
28. On December 11, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $215.00 for 
December rent and continued to pay the monthly rent on space 
#100. On January 3, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $215.00 for January 
rent for space #100. On February 5, 1996, Sam Peebles paid . 
$215.00 for February rent for space #100. On March 5, 1996, Sam 
Peebles paid $215.00 March rent for space #100. (T. at 415-16; 
Exhibit P-58, attached hereto as Appendice E.) 
29. After Jake Grider's application was rejected, Sam 
Peebles continued to make repairs to the Mobile Home in order to 
sell it in the Park. (T. at 421.) 
30. Sam Peebles invested $5,000 to $6,000 in improvements 
to the Mobile Home.3 
3Sam Peebles retarred and reshingled the roof. (T. at 422-
32); hired someone to steam clean the exterior of the Mobile Home 
(T. at 422); replaced the skirting around the exterior (T. at 
424) ; put new trim on parts of the exterior (T. at 426) ; 
installed new carpet in two bedrooms (T. at 427); replaced part 
of the railing (T. at 433); put new linoleum in the bathroom and 
the kitchen (T. at 441); replaced the subfloor in the bathroom 
9 
31. On or about April 11, 1996, Brookside posted a 5-day 
"Notice to Quit" on Mobile Home, advising Sam Peebles that he had 
5-days to remove the Mobile Home from space #100 or he would be 
in "unlawful detainer" under the Unlawful Detainer Act. (Exhibit 
P-42, attached hereto as Appendice F.) 
32. On April 12, 1996, Sam Peebles entered into another 
Real Estate Purchase Contract to sell his Mobile Home to Marie 
Gibson. (T. at 376, Line 8-22.) 
33. Marie Gibson had also been approved by Washington 
Mutual for a loan to purchase the Mobile Home. (T. at 3 82.) 
34. Brookside denied Marie Gibson's application for 
residency. (T. at 379.) 
35. Shortly thereafter, Marie Gibson purchased a mobile 
home in Shadowridge Mobile Home Park and was approved for 
residency in that park. (T. at 382-83.) 
36. On September 25, 1996, Sam Peebles entered into a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract to sell his Mobile Home to Jackie 
Southworth ("Ms. Southworth") for $25,000. (T. at 296; Exhibit 
D-67, attached hereto as Appendice G.) 
(T. at 441); textured the ceilings in the bathroom, hallways and 
two bedrooms (T. at 441); repaired or replaced several light 
fixtures (T. at 441); replaced shower fixtures (T. at 442); 
replaced five windows (T. at 358); paneled the closets (T. at 
3 58); replaced three interior doors and one exterior door (T. at 
361); repaired the front gate and fence (T. at 361); and hauled 
two 16' trailer loads of trash to the dump (T. at 361). 
10 
37. Ms. Southworth had an inspector and a subcontractor go 
through the Mobile Home. (T. at 312.) 
38. Based on the inspector and subcontractor's 
recommendations, Ms. Southworth was prepared to invest $4,000 in 
improving the Mobile Home, and she had a list of improvements to 
review with the Park manager. (T. at 306-308.) 
39. Ms. Southworth owned a Mental assisting training 
program and dental practice." Because she was self-employed, she 
was also prepared to discuss her financial information with the 
Park, including providing tax returns if necessary. (T. at 306-
08.) 
40. Ms. Southworth made an appointment with Jim Prentice, 
the Park manager, to fill out the residency application, discuss 
the list of improvements she wanted to make and review her 
financial information. (T. at 313.) 
41. Upon arriving at the Park, Jim Prentice turned Ms. 
Southworth away, refusing to meet with her or even allow her to 
fill out an application for residency. (T. at 313.) 
42. Sam Peebles called other mobile home parks, but could 
not find any spaces available along the Wasatch Front. (T. at 
446.) 
43. Sam Peebles finally moved his Mobile Home to Evanston, 
Wyoming, where he sold it at a net profit of $1,422.60. (T. at 
11 
520.) 
44. From his $591 payment on October 31, 1995, until 
November, 1997, when the Mobile Home was moved out of the Park, 
Sam Peebles made all monthly lot rent payments on space #100 to 
Brookside. (T. at 416.) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. On April 10, 1996, Brookside filed a Complaint against 
Sam Peebles alleging unlawful detainer by Sam Peebles of lot #100 
of the Park. (R. 1-7.) 
2. On May 9, 1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint 
adding Harold Peebles as a defendant. (R. at 1-7; 17-24.) 
3. On August 8, 1996, Brookside filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 4 0 6.) 
4. On December 4, 1996, Judge Barrett denied Brookside's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. On March 28, 1997, the court granted Sam Peebles leave 
to file a Counterclaim, which alleged that Brookside had 
wrongfully withheld approval of three prospective purchasers. 
(R. at 231.) 
6. On August 11, 1997, Brookside filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, on grounds similar to those in the first Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. at 440-544.) 
7. On October 27, 1997, Judge Fratto filed a Notice of 
12 
Decision granting plaintiff's second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. at 616-18.) 
8. On November 18, 1997, Sam and Harold Peebles filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration. (R. at 694.) 
9. On March 13, 1998, the court entered an Order granting 
defendants' Motions for Reconsideration and denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 749-50.) 
10. A jury trial was held on October 1, 2 and 5, 1998. (T. 
at 1-721.) 
11. Following plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a 
directed verdict as to Sam Peebles on the following grounds: 
A. The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that 
"[u]nlawful detainer by an owner resident of 
a mobile home is determined under Title 57, 
Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(2) (1996). Because 
Sam Peebles is an "owner" and "resident," 
plaintiff must proceed under the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act, not under the Unlawful 
Detainer Act. (T. at 237-240.) 
B. Even if the Unlawful Detainer Act does 
apply, Sam Peebles had been paying monthly 
rent (i.e., $591 on October 31, 1995, $215 in 
December, 1995, January, 1996, February, 1996 
and March, 1996) and, as a matter of law, Sam 
Peebles was a month-to-month tenant and must 
be given at least 15-days notice under 
section 78-36-3(1)(b)(i), and could not be 
evicted as a "tenant at will." (T. at 237-
240. ) 
C. Even if the Unlawful Detainer Act does 
apply, and if Sam Peebles was a "tenant at 
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will/' Brookside failed to serve Sam Peebles 
with the 5-day notice in the manne * provided 
in section 78-36-6(4). (T. at 237-240.) 
12. Defendant also moved for a directed verdict as to 
Harold Peebles on the same three grounds, as well as the 
additional ground that there had been no service of the 5-day 
notice on Harold Peebles since Harold Peebles was not named on 
the 5-day "Notice to Quit." (T. at 237-240.) 
13. The trial court granted both motions for directed 
verdict. (T. at 258-263.) 
14. Defendant Sam Peebles then presented his counterclaim 
to the jury. (T. at 284-627.) 
15. The jury answered the following questions: 
1A. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that prior to January 4, 1995, when Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, that 
defendant Sam Peebles had a written lease or 
rental agreement with the Park for the lease of 
Space #100? 
Yes X No 
IB. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Sam Peebles' lease or rental agreement was 
surrendered? 
Yes No X 
1C. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. assumed Sam 
Peebles lease or rental agreement? 
Yes No X 
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IIA. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. unreasonably 
withheld approval of one or more prospective 
purchasers of Sam Peebles' Mobile Home, to become 
a resident in the Park? 
Yes No X 
(R. at 920-21, attached hereto as Appendice H.) 
16. On October 28, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs as the prevailing 
party on the Counterclaim. (R. at 1100.) 
17. On November 5, 1998, defendants filed a Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs, the prevailing parties on the 
eviction action. (R. at 1161.) 
18. On March 1, 1999, the court denied both motions. (R. 
at 1285.) 
19. On May 26, 1999, a final Judgement was entered. (R. at 
1292. ) 
20. On June 1, 1999, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. 
(R. at 1300.) 
21. On June 8, 1999, defendant filed a Notice of Cross-
Appeal. (R. at 1305.) 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and thereby denying 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because numerous factual 
15 
issues existed which precluded summary judgment. Furthermore, 
even assuming that Sam Peebles' supplemental affidavit 
contradicted his deposition testimony, and Brookside was a common 
law bona fide purchaser, as plaintiff contends, the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act and Unlawful Detainer Act renders both issues 
moot; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and thereby 
denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Second, the trial court did not err in granting defendants' 
Motion for Directed Verdict. The facts of this case support the 
trial court's grant of defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict 
because 1) the Unlawful Detainer Act does not apply; 2) even if 
the Unlawful Detainer Act applied, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant 
at will"; and 3) Sam Peebles was not properly served notice under 
the Unlawful Detainer Act. Furthermore, plaintiff's argument 
that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict because 
Brookside did not "assume" Sam Peebles' lease is rendered moot by 
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and Unlawful Detainer Act. 
Under those Acts, with which plaintiff failed to comply, the 
trial court properly granted defendants' Motion for Directed 
Verdict. 
Third, the jury erred in finding that plaintiff's refusal to 
accept an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not 
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an "unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under 
section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code. The Utah Code provides that 
a "mobile home park . . . may not . . . unreasonably withh[o]Id" 
approval of a prospective purchaser. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-4(4) 
(Supp. 1999). The prospective purchaser in this case, Ms. 
Southworth (the last of three prospective purchasers to be 
rejected by plaintiff), was willing to spend $4,000 on 
improvements on the Mobile Home, had an inspector and 
subcontractor inspect the Mobile Home, and had her financial 
information, including tax returns, available for review if 
necessary. Nevertheless, Brookside refused to meet with her, and 
refused to allow her to fill out an application. Plaintiff's 
actions constituted an "unreasonable withh[o]Id[ing]" of a 
prospective purchaser, and the jury verdict should therefore be 
reversed. 
Fourth, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs. In 
order to recover attorney's fees and court costs, plaintiff must 
direct this Court to some statute or contractual basis for that 
owned. Plaintiff has not done so. Plaintiff's argument that 
section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code supports its claim for 
attorney's fees and court costs must be rejected since by its 
terms, section 57-16-8 does not award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party on the counterclaim. 
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Finally, the trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion 
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs. The Utah Code 
provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction 
proceeding . . . [t]he prevailing party is . . . entitled to 
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-
16-8 (1994). Defendants contested an eviction proceeding, and -
they prevailed on the eviction proceeding; therefore, under Utah 
law, defendants are entitled to ''court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees." Id. The trial court's denial of defendants' 
Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs was 
therefore incorrect, and this Court should reverse that decision 
and remand this case for a determination consistent therewith, 
including attorney's fees and costs incurred by defendants for 
successfully defending plaintiff's appeal of the eviction action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. Even assuming arguendo 
plaintiff's contentions that Sam Peebles' Supplemental affidavit 
contradicted his deposition testimony, and that Brookside was a 
common law bona fide purchaser, the trial court's decision to 
grant defendants' Motion for Reconsideration was not an "abuse of 
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discretion" because the application of the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act and the Unlawful Detainer Act rendered both issues 
moot. 
Moreover, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, i.e., Peebles, disputed issues of 
material facts existed which precluded summary judgment for the 
moving party, i.e., Brookside. See Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & 
Gen, Med, Clinic, Inc. , 2000 UT 18, 1J4, 994 P.2d 1261, 1263 
(setting forth standard for reviewing motion for summary 
judgment). Even assuming arguendo plaintiff's contentions that 
the common law "surrender" doctrine and/or the common law "bona 
fide purchaser" doctrine were relevant in this case, numerous 
disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and that 
decision should be allowed to stand. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Summary Judgment on plaintiff's "surrender" claim 
1. Even disregarding Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits, 
other issues of material fact existed regarding 
plaintiff's "surrender" claims which supported the trial 
court's denial of summary judgment 
Even disregarding Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits, 
other issues of material fact existed which supported the trial 
court's denial of summary judgment on Brookside's "surrender" 
19 
claim. Under the common law doctrine of "surrender and 
acceptance:" a) a tenant must "surrender [] the premises to [the] 
landlord before a lease term expires," b) the tenant must intend 
to "rescind" or "terminate" the lease, and c) the landlord must 
"accept the surrender." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 776 P.2d 
896, 900-01 (Utah 1989) (discussing elements of surrender and 
acceptance). In this case, even disregarding Sam Peebles' 
Supplemental Affidavits, all three elements were in dispute. 
(a) No surrender of the premises 
First, Sam Peebles did not surrender lot #100 to Brookside 
at the time Brookside entered into its lease with Richard Rowley. 
Sam Peebles' Mobile Home was on lot #100. Accordingly, the first 
element was not satisfied. 
(b) No intent by Sam Peebles to surrender his lease 
Second, there was an issue of fact as to whether Sam Peebles 
intended to surrender his lease. Plaintiff argues that the 
following testimony from Sam Peebles' deposition is conclusive 
evidence that Sam Peebles intended to surrender his lease: 
Q. Okay. Each time there people leased the 
trailer from you, do you know if they made an 
application with the park to lease this? 
A. Yes, they did. They were suppose to. 
Q. Okay. And they would have gone through an 
application process? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. They would have to sign a lease agreement? 
A. Yup. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 21-22.) 
Sam Peebles assumed that Richard Rowley signed a lease with the 
Park because it was common practice to have both the sublessee 
and sublessor enter into lease with the Park to guarantee payment 
of lot rent. 
In her deposition testimony, Jan Shupe, one of the Park 
managers, testified that it was common to have two leases for the 
same space (one between the Park and the sublessee and one 
between the Park and the sublessor) to ensure payment of rent: 
Q. Would it be your common practice as the 
manager to have two leases for the same 
space, one lease with Mr. Rowley, and 
one lease with Mr. Peebles for the same 
space? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why would you do that? 
A. Well, to guarantee the lot rent. If Rowley 
didn't [pay], then Peebles would have to. 
(R. 332, 592.) 
Ms. Shupe's testimony illustrates that it was common practice for 
the Park to use two leases. Sam Peebles' knowledge that the Park 
may have required Rowley to enter into a separate lease did not 
constitute an intent by Sam Peebles to surrender his lease. This 
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was evidenced by Sam Peebles' payment of $591 in back rent owed 
by Richard Rowley on October 31, 1995. Had Sam Peebles intended 
to surrender his lease, he would not have paid back rent to the 
Park. 
(c) No intent by Brookside to accept a surrender 
Third, there is no evidence that Brookside intended to 
accept a surrender of Sam Peebles' lease when Richard Rowley 
entered into a lease with Brookside on or about April 1, 1995. 
After Richard Rowley moved out, the park manager for Brookside 
called Sam Peebles and asked him to pay on the back rent for lot 
#100. (T. at 413.) On October 31, 1995, Sam Peebles paid the 
$591 in back rent owed on lot #100. (T. at 413-14; Exhibit D-72, 
attached hereto as Appendice C.) On December 11, 1995, Brookside 
served Sam Peebles with a written notice stating that Brookside 
would "terminate [Sam Peebles'] lease" if he did not continue 
making the rent payments. (T. 4 95; Exhibit D-82, attached hereto 
as Appendice D.) Had Brookside intended to accept a surrender of 
Sam Peebles' lease, Brookside would not have continued to look to 
Sam Peebles for payment of the rent. 
Brookside argues that "[t]he doctrine of surrender requires 
only that the Peebles assented the creation of an estate between 
Rowley and Brookside." Brief of Appellant at 14, Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App. 
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filed Feb. 14, 2000) (footnote omitted). In fact, that is not of 
the law. In the authority cited for that proposition, Brookside 
failed to include the underlined portion: 
There is a presumption that acceptance by 
the tenant of a new lease of the premises 
during the term of an old lease operates as a 
surrender of the old lease by act of the 
parties; that is, a surrender of a lease is 
implied by law when another estate is created 
by the reversioner or remainderman, with the 
assent of the tenant, that is incompatible 
with the existing term. Thus, as a general 
rule, when a new lease of the premises is 
taken by the lessee from the lessor for the 
whole or a part of the term embraced in the 
former one, there is said to be a surrender 
in law because the giving of a new lease 
necessarily implies a surrender of the old 
one. 
49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995) (emphasis added & 
footnotes omitted); compare Brief of Appellant at 14 n.2, 
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. No. 990518 (Utah Ct. 
App. filed Feb. 14, 2000) (misstating same). When the first line 
is restored, it is clear that the quote cited by plaintiff 
involves a situation where the same tenant signs a second lease 
for the premises prior to the expiration of the first lease. 
That is not what occurred in this case; thus, plaintiff's 
statement of the applicable law is misplaced, and it should be 
disregarded by this Court. 
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The other case, Automatic Gas Distributors, Inc. v. State 
Bank of Green River, 817 P.2d 441 (Wyo. 1991), which is also 
cited by plaintiff, should likewise be disregarded by this Court 
because it stands for the sa e proposition as the previous 
citation: "[A]cceptance by the tenant of a new lease of the 
demised premises during the term of an old lease operates as a 
surrender of the old lease by the act of the parties." Id. at 
443. Because Sam Peebles was not a party to the "Rowley lease," 
the principle set forth in Automatic Gas is inapplicable and 
should not be relied upon by this Court as a basis for reversing 
the trial court's decision denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavit did not conflict with 
his deposition 
Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits did not conflict with 
his deposition testimony. In his Supplemental Affidavits, Sam 
Peebles clarified that even though he knew that Rowley may have 
entered into a lease with the Park, he did not intended to 
surrender his lease. The jury agreed with Sam Peebles and found 
that Sam Peebles did not surrender his lease. (£L££. Jury's 
response to interrogatory number IB, R. at 920.) To find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not granting plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is to overturn the jury verdict on 
this issue. 
24 
3. Even if Peebles had surrendered his lfiaser Brooksidp 
failed to comply with the Unlawful Detainer Ant 
and Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
Even if Sam Peebles had surrendered his lease in April, 
1994, as a result of Rowley's lease being signed, and the jury's 
finding that Sam Peebles did not surrender his lease is reversed, 
the trial court still did not abuse its discretion in granting 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration since plaintiff still 
failed to make a prima facie case against Sam Peebles under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act. Those grounds are discussed more fully 
under Section II.4 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
summary judgment on Brookside's "bona fide purchaser" 
claim 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting 
Summary Judgment on Brookside's Bona Fide Purchaser claim because 
disputed issues of material fact existed as to: 1) Whether 
4Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case against Sam 
Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act in three particulars: 1) 
Section 78-36-3(2) provides that "[u]nlawful detainer by an owner 
resident is determined under ... [the] Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act," not under the Unlawful Detainer Act, 2) by paying monthly 
lot rent for seven months Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will," 
but was at least a "month-to-month" tenant entitled to 15-days 
notice under section 78-36-3(1)(b)(i), and 3) Brookside had 
failed to properly serve Sam Peebles with the 5-day notice under 
section 78-36-6. 
The jury verdict provided an additional ground to dismiss 
the eviction action. In finding that Sam Peebles had a "written 
lease" for space #100 that had never been surrendered, Sam 
Peebles was entitled to the protection of section 57-16-4(1). 
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Brookside was a "common law" bona fide purchaser; 2) whether the 
"common law" bona fide Purchaser rule has been pre-empted by the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and 3) whether, even if Brookside 
was a "bona fide purchaser" and the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act did not apply, Brookside failed to comply with the Unlawful 
Detainer Act. 
1. Brookside was not a "bona fide purchaser" 
At the very least, Brookside purchased the Park with 
constructive notice of Sam Peebles' lease since Sam Peebles' 
Mobile Home was located on space #100. Under those 
circumstances, the "[grantee's] position is no stronger than that 
of [its] grantors." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 
622 (Utah 1940) . In Latses, the grantor claimed that he had no 
"knowledge of such a lease" and contended that "the agent had no 
authority to enter into it." Xd. at 621. The court held that 
the lease was nevertheless valid, and the grantee took the 
property "subject to" the lease. Id. at 622. The same analysis 
applies here. The jury found that Sam Peebles had a "written 
lease" with Brookside's predecessor that had never been 
surrendered. Brookside had "constructive notice" of the Peebles 
lease since the Peebles' Mobile Home was located on space #100 at 
the time of the purchase. Therefore, Brookside's "position is no 
stronger than that of [it's predecessor]." Id. 
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2. Brookside assumed the Peebles lease under the Assignment 
At the time Brookside purchased the Park, under the 
Assignment, Brookside assumed all "leases and agreements 
appurtenant to the Property."5 Because Sam Peebles had a written 
lease with Brookside's predecessor in interest, which was 
appurtenant to the Park, that lease was assigned to Brookside. 
The November, 1994, rent roll attached to the Assignment 
listed "Rowley" as the "resident" of Space #100 of Brookside 
Mobile Home Park. (Richard and LaDawn Rowley were subleasing 
that space from Sam Peebles, who owned the Mobile Home on Space 
#100 and who had the underlying lease for Space #100). There 
was, however, no list of the specific leases that were 
appurtenant to the property. Accordingly, because Sam Peebles' 
lease was appurtenant to the property, it was assigned to 
Brookside under the Assignment. 
3. The common law "bona fide purchaser" rule is pre-empted 
by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
Even if Brookside was a common law "bona fide purchaser" and 
5In the second recital of the Assignment of Leases and 
Deposits, the term "leases" is defined as "all of [the 
assignor's] right, title and interest in and to those certain 
leases, rental agreements, security or other deposits from 
tenants, and rentals with respect to such leases and agreements 
appurtenant to the property." In paragraph 1 of the Assignment 
of Leases and Deposits, Brookside Associates (the "Assignor") 
"bargains, sales, assigns, transfers sets over to Assignee, all 
of its right, title and interest in and to the leases." 
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has not assumed Sam Peebles' lease, the common law "bona fide 
purchaser" rule is pre-empted by the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act. Section 57-16-4(1) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] 
mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or 
rental agreement upon any grounds other than as specified in this 
chapter." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-4(1) (Supp. 1999). There is no 
"bona fide purchaser" exception to section 57-16-4(1). 
Accordingly, if a person has a "lease or rental agreement" for a 
space within a mobile home park, that "lease or rental agreement" 
may not be terminated except as provided in the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. It makes no difference whether the lease or 
rental agreement is with the present owner of the Park or a 
previous owner of the Park. The rationale for not providing a 
bona fide purchase exception under the Act is simple. A mobile 
home park resident has no control over whether his lease is 
properly transferred to a new purchaser of the park. If all 
existing leases are not properly disclosed to a purchaser of a 
park, the purchaser's remedy is against the seller, not the 
tenant. The tenant should not be penalized by losing his rights 
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act under circumstances 
(i.e., a sale of the park) over which he has no control. 
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4. Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act does not pre-empt the 
common law "bona fide purchaser" rule, Brookside failed 
to comply with the Unlawful Detainer Act 
Even if Brookside was a "bona fide purchaser" of the Park, 
and even if Brookside took the Park free of Sam Peebles' lease 
notwithstanding the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, the trial 
court still did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants' 
Motion to Reconsider because Brookside failed to comply with the 
Unlawful Detainer Act.6 Those grounds are discussed more fully 
in under Section II. 
5. Brookside's claim for unlawful detainer is moot 
Even assuming Brookside's action for unlawful detainer is 
proper in all respects, the issue of unlawful detainer is moot 
since Peebles vacated space #100 in November, 1997. (T. at 158.) 
The issue of damages is also moot since Sam Peebles has paid all 
rent due and owing through the date he vacated lot #100. 
(a) Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor" 
Because Peebles has vacated space #100 Brookside's only 
remaining claim is for "treble damages" from April, 1995 through 
November, 1997, the period the Peebles are alleged to have been 
6In its memorandum decision granting defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, one basis stated by the court for granting that 
Motion for Reconsideration was that "facts could be interpreted 
to demonstrate that [Sam Peebles] was dealt with by Plaintiff in 
a manner reflective of his perceived position as [a] tenant. 
Most notably, that the notice to vacate refers to defendant as a 
tenant." (R. at 744.) This was the grounds upon which the court 
dismissed the Amended Complaint in its directed verdict. 
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in "unlawful detainer." Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code 
provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction 
proceeding, all rents, fees and services charges due and incurred 
during the pendency of the action shall be paid into the court 
. . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 7 - 1 6 - 8 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . I n t h i s c a s e , a s a n 
accommodation to Brookside, the rents were paid directly to 
Brookside during the pendency of this litigation. Section 57-16-
8 does not provide for a trebling of rents, however. 
Accordingly, with all rents paid and the premises vacated, the 
issue of unlawful detainer is moot. 
(b) The Unlawful Detainer Act does not allow for treble • 
damages in this case 
Irrespective of Section 57-16-8, treble damages are not 
allowed for by the Unlawful Detainer Act in this case. The 
relevant language from the Unlawful Detainer Act is as follows: 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from 
any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premisses during the 
defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in 
the complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged 
unlawful detainer is after default in the 
payment of rent; and 
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(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction 
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-
38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant 
for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages 
assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and 
for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided 
for in the lease or agreement. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 (1996) . 
Under that language, there are only treble rents for damages 
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c). There is no trebling of 
(2)(d) "amount of rent due." The "rental value" of space #100 is 
not a damage since the rent was paid during the pendency of the 
litigation. The provision for treble damages is "highly penal 
and therefore is subject to strict construction." Forrester v. 
Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930). Accordingly, because the 
Peebles have vacated the premises and paid all rents, there are 
no damages for the rents due, and there is no basis for treble 
damages for unpaid rent. Therefore, the unlawful detainer claim 
is moot. 
C. The trial court had additional grounds to grant 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
There were also other reasonable grounds for granting 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
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(a) Waiver and estoppel 
Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and Sam Peebles 
had surrendered his lease, there was a factual issue as to 
whether Brookside had waived these defenses or was estopped from 
raising them by accepting rent from Sam Peebles from October 1995 
through March 1996.7 See, e.g., Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 
248 (Utah 1983)(stating that u[w]here by reason of a breach of a 
condition, a lease becomes forfeited, the lessor is entitled to 
recover possession. He waives that right by the acceptance of 
rent. He cannot accept rent, and at the same time claim a 
forfeiture of the lease.") (Emphasis added & footnote omitted). 
(b) Law of the case 
Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and Sam Peebles 
had surrendered his lease, under the "law of the case," having 
denied Brookside's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
should not have considered a second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on substantially the same ground. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)(stating that the "law of the case" provides a presumption 
that the court's prior rulings are "correct and should stand."). 
7These defenses were raised as an affirmative defenses in 
Defendants' Amended Answer. (R. at 137-38.) 
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D. Harold Peebles 
In addition to the foregoing, there is nothing in 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment alleging any basis for 
judgment against Harold Peebles. Harold Peebles never occupied 
the space, never leased the space, and never had any dealings 
with Brookside. 
In sum, there are numerous "reasonable grounds" to uphold 
the trial court's decision to grant defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, and thereby deny plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Accordingly, this Court should allow the trial court's 
decision to stand. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
The trial court correctly granted defendant's Motion for 
Directed Verdict. Brookside's sole argument for overturning the 
trial court's directed verdict is that the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act does not apply because there was "no lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles." Brief of Appellant at 19, Brookside 
Mobile Homfi Parkr Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App. 
filed Feb. 14, 2000). Plaintiff argues that "[t]he trial 
court's action is especially nonsensical in that the jury later 
found under special verdict instructions that no lease existed 
between Brookside and Peebles." Id. 
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Plaintiff misapprehends the basis for the trial court's 
directed verdict. All three grounds for dismissal were based on 
Brookside's failure to establish a prima facia case under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act. The trial court correctly granted a 
directed verdict as to Sam Peebles because: 1) The Unlawful 
Detainer Act does not apply; 2) even if the Unlawful Detainer Act 
did apply, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will" and; 3) Sam 
Peebles was not properly served. 
A. The Unlawful Detainer Act does not apply 
The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that "[u]nlawful detainer 
by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under Title 
57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-36-3(2) (1996). Sam Peebles was an "owner" of the Mobile Home 
as evidenced by the title to the Mobile Home that was introduced 
at trial. 
A "resident" of a mobile home is defined as "an individual 
who leases or rents space in a Mobile Home park." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
57-16-3(3) (1994). By the conclusion of plaintiff's case, 
evidence had been introduced that Sam Peebles had paid Brookside 
$591 in rent for space #100 on October 31, 1995, $215 in rent on 
December 11, 1995, $215 in rent on January 3, 1996, $215 in rent 
on February 5, 1996 and $215 in rent on March 5, 1996. On April 
10, 1996, Sam Peebles was served with a 5-day Notice to Quit as a 
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"tenant at will." Accordingly, Sam Peebles was a "resident" at 
the time the 5-day notice was served since he was "an individual 
who leases or rents space in a Mobile Home park." 
Therefore, having met the definition of "owner resident," 
Brookside could not proceed against Sam Peebles under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act. The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that 
"[u]nlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is 
determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(2) (1996). Because plaintiff 
brought its eviction action under the wrong statute, i.e., under 
the Unlawful Detainer Act rather than the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act, the trial court properly dismissed Brookside's 
Amended Complaint, and determined that Brookside could not evict 
Sam Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act but must proceed 
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
B. Sam Peebles was not a "Tenant at Will" 
Brookside served Sam Peebles with a 5-day Notice to Quit as 
a "tenant at will." At the very least, because Sam Peebles was 
making monthly rental payments, he was entitled to 15-day notice 
under section 78-36-3(1) (b) (i) of the Utah Code. The Unlawful 
Detainer Act requires 15-day of notice before termination of a 
month-to-month tenancy: 
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(1) A tenant of real property, for term less than life, is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(b) when, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly or other 
periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in 
person or by subtenant after the end 
of any month or period, in cases 
where the owner, his designated 
agent, or any successor in estate of 
the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has 
served notice requiring him to quite 
the premises at the expiration of 
that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, 
where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration 
of a notice of not less than five 
day . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3 (1) (b) (i) - (ii) (1996). 
As a matter of law, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will." 
See Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 446 A.2d 862, 
865 (N.J. 1982) (holding that mobile home park tenants, without 
written leases, paying month to month rent, are not tenants at 
will) ; Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Ino+, 515 
P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1973) (holding that tenant under invalid or 
unenforceable lease is not a tenant at will). 
Sam Peebles had been making monthly rental payment to 
Brookside since October, 1995. Therefore, even if the Unlawful 
Detainer Act did apply, Sam Peebles was a month-to-month tenant 
entitled to 15-days notice under section 78-36-3(1) (b) (i) . 
36 
C. The 15-day Notice was improperly served. 
In order to make a prima facie case for eviction under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act, Brookside must prove that Sam Peebles 
"remain[ed] in possession . . . after the expiration of a notice 
of not less than five days." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(1) (b) (i) 
(1996) . Section 78-36-6 sets forth the requirements for service 
of that notice: 
if a person of suitable age or discretion 
cannot be found at the place of residence, 
then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous 
place on the leased property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-6 (2) (d) (Supp. 1999). 
In this case, Brookside knew that Sam Peebles did not live 
in the Mobile Home. Plaintiff also knew Sam Peebles' "place of 
residence" because that address (12067 South 2240 West, Riverton, 
Utah 84065) was written on the 5-day notice. At trial, plaintiff 
introduced no evidence that a "person of suitable age or 
discretion could not be located at [Sam Peebles'] place of 
residence." The 5-day notice was only posted on the Mobile Home. 
Brookside should not be able to "start the clock running" on 
alleged "treble damages" by affixing a notice on a vacant Mobile 
Home when Brookside knew where the owner resided and made no 
effort to serve him at his place of residence, as required by 
section 78-36-6. 
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D. The directed verdict should also be upheld because of the 
jury's later findings 
The jury provided an additional ground on which to uphold 
the trial court's directed verdict. In answering Interrogatories 
No. 1A, the jury found that prior to January 4, 1995, when 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, defendant Sam 
Peebles had a written lease or rental agreement with the Park for 
the lease of Space #100. (R. at 920.) The jury also found that 
Sam Peebles' lease or rental agreement was not surrendered. (R. 
at 920.) Accordingly, pursuant to section 57-16-4(1), Brookside 
could "not terminate [Sam Peebles' lease] . . . upon any ground 
other than as specified in [the Mobile Home Park Residency Act]." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-4(1) (Supp. 1999). It is undisputed that 
Brookside did not terminate Sam Peebles' lease on any ground set 
forth in that Act. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Granted a Directed Verdict as 
to Harold Peebles 
The trial court correctly granted a directed verdict as to 
Harold Peebles for the same reasons set forth for Sam Peebles. 
In addition, there was no service of a 5-day notice on Harold 
Peebles, and there was no case presented against Harold Peebles 
at trial. 
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1. No Service of 5-day notice 
There was no service of the 5-day notice on Harold Peebles. 
The only name on the 5-day Notice to Quite is Sam Peebles. (S££. 
Exhibit P-42, attached hereto as Appendice F.) 
2. No case against Harold Peebles 
Brookside presented no case against Harold Peebles at trial: 
Judge Fratto: Presented at the trial there 
has been no evidence that would indicate that 
Harold Peebles is involved at all. None of 
the witnesses, as I recall, identified him 
... [I]n other words, I haven't heard 
anything about Harold Peebles. I think the 
record would then [disclose] his name has not 
been uttered by any witness. 
(T. at 260, lines 13-21.) 
Plaintiff has cited nothing in its brief to dispute the foregoing 
assertion. Therefore, because Brookside made no case against 
Harold Peebles at trial, the trial court did not err in granting 
a directed verdict in his favor. 
III. THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL 
TO ALLOW MS. SOUTHWORTH TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION 
FOR RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE 
The jury erred in finding that Brookside's refusal to accept 
an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not an 
"unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. The Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act provides that a mobile home park may not unreasonably refuse 
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approval of a "prospective purchaser" of a mobile home within the 
park: 
Any rule or condition of a lease purporting 
to prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of 
a mobile home belonging to a resident is void 
and unenforceable. The mobile home park may, 
however, reserve the right to approve the 
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who 
intend to become a resident, but the approval 
may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile 
home park may require proof of ownership as a 
condition of approval. The mobile home park 
may unconditionally refuse to approve any 
purchaser of a mobile home who does not 
register prior to purchase. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 7 - 1 6 - 4 ( 4 ) ( S u p p . 1999) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 
In this case, Ms. Southworth was the third prospective purchaser 
for Sam Peebles' Mobile Home that Brookside refused to approve 
for residency within the Park. 
By the time Ms. Southworth attempted to apply for residency, 
the Park refused to even meet with her or accept her application. 
On September 25, 1996, Ms. Southworth entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract to purchase the Mobile Home for $25,000. Ms. 
Southworth's real estate agent advised her that she would need to 
"coordinate a time to meet with [the park manager] for qualifying 
for the park." (T. at 296, lines 23-24.) Ms. Southworth called 
the Park Manager, Jim Prentice, and he advised her that she would 
need to "get a credit report." (T. at 2 97, Line 1.) Ms. 
Southworth did as she was directed and she obtained a credit 
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report through Western Credit, which she paid for herself. (T. 
at 297, Line 10-12. ) 
Ms. Southworth also had an inspector inspect the Mobile 
Home. Ms. Southworth testified that "I'm very meticulous about 
what I live in, how it looks and so forth." (T. at 311, Line 7-
8.) She also testified that " [b]ecause I have children, and I'm 
concerned about their welfare, making sure everything is done 
right to coue, to make sure that the wiring and the plumbing and 
the environment is safe." (T. at 312, line 8-19.) The inspector 
"went through specific things that had to be brought up to code." 
(T. at 305, line 1-6, 308, line 16-25.) Ms. Southworth also had 
a subcontractor inspect at the Mobile Home. Ms. Southworth 
testified that "I know that [the Mobile Home] needs some repairs, 
and I was willing to put the money into it." (T. at 312, line 1-
2.) Based on those reports, Ms. Southworth stated that she was 
going to put an additional $4,000.00 in improvements into the 
Mobile Home: 
I had a subcontractor come out with me and 
look at it, and in fact he listed the price 
of what everything would cost me. [T]he cost 
of repairs was about $4,000.00 that I was 
going to put into that trailer. 
(T. at 10-15.) Ms. Southworth compiled a list of improvements 
that she was going to make, and she wanted to discuss those with 
Jim Prentice, the Park manager. (T. at 312, line 20-22.) 
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Ms. Southworth made an appointment to meet with Jim Prentice 
to fill out the application for residency, review her financial 
information and go over the list of improvements she wanted to 
make to the property. However, Ms. Southworth testified that Jim 
Prentice refused to meet with her: 
I had gone to the office at 1:00, he was not 
in the office. I then called my irealtor and 
told her, have you heard from him, I haven't. 
I then went back to the park and sat at the 
office until somebody showed up. I got out 
of the car. I then said, are you Jim? And 
he had a trach[eotomy], apparently he said 
yes, I am. I said, I'm Jackie Southworth I 
was to meet with you 1:00. It was then 20 
minutes after 1. He turned around kind of. 
I took it very personal that he was angry at 
me and said you can't buy that trailer, it 
has to be moved it's in legality, it's in a 
legality situation. I didn't even get my 
door shut on my car before I was sent away by 
him. 
(T. at 301, line 12-25.) Ms. Southworth further testified that 
Jim Prentice refused to allow her to fill out an application or 
discuss the improvements she was going to make to the trailer: 
Q. Okay. So you wanted to discuss with him 
the repairs that you were going to make? 
A. Improvements for the park. 
Q. Was he willing to discuss that with you? 
A. He would not give me the time of day. He refused 
to discuss with me anything. 
Q. You said that you'd had with you the 
credit information we looked at? 
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A. Exactly. 
Q. And were you going to review that with 
him? 
A. Yes, I was, as well as fill out the application 
for the park. 
Q. Okay. And you didn't have an 
opportunity to do that? 
A. I never got my foot in the door. 
(T. at 313, line 4-18. ) 
After Ms. Southworth testified, Jim Prentice took the stand. 
He did not dispute that he refused to allow Ms. Southworth to 
submit an application for residency in the Park. Jim Prentice 
did not dispute that he had refused to meet with Ms. Southworth. 
Jim Prentice testified that he told her "she had been denied by 
the owner." (T. at 616.) 
Alan Glover, the owner of the Park, had previously testified 
that he had rejected Ms. Southworth's application for two reason: 
1) he was "unable to verify employment," and 2) the "repairs on 
the home" were not completed "at that time." (T. at 70.) 
A. Unable to Verify Employment 
Ms. Southworth was self-employed and she "owned a dental 
assisting training program and a dental practice." (T. at 299, 
line 16-17.) Apparently, Western Credit could not "verify her 
employment." 
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Ms. Southworth testified that "I would not allow any of my 
banks or personnel to verify anything to anyone without okay from 
me." (T. at 307, line 23-24.) However, Ms. Southworth testified 
that she could "verify [her income] by tax returns at anytime." 
(T. at 308, line 4-5.) At the time she came to discuss the 
matter with Jim Prentice she was prepared to review her financial 
information with him. Jim Prentice would not meet with her or 
allow her to fill out an application for residency. 
B. Repairs not Made 
As to Mr. Glover's testimony that Ms. Southworth was 
rejected because all repairs had not been made to the Mobile 
Home, Ms. Southworth testified that "I didn't even have time to 
explain to him I had brought in a list of repairs and 
improvements that I wanted to do the place .... I didn't even 
get the door shut on my car, I didn't even get in the office." 
(T. at 302, line 4-9.) 
Ms. Southworth planned to invest an additional $4000 in 
upgrading the Mobile Home. For example, Ms. Southworth testified 
that she wanted "to put a gate in where I could pour a cement pad 
and have covered parking for my vet." (T. at 313, 1-3.) "[T]he 
repairs that were being done were obvious ... [a][n]ew floor and 
so on and so forth." (T. at 305, 12-16.) "It had a brand new 
roof put on it." (T. at 309, line 24.) "I was going to paint it 
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and do a lot of improvements on the lot." (T. at 3 09, line 25; 
310, line 1.) "The shed that was there I did not want, I wanted 
it taken away. I had a metal shed that I wanted to replace it 
with." (T. at 308, line 14-18.) "I knew that it needed some 
repairs, and I was willing to put the money into that, you know, 
to have that for my own." (T. at 312, line 25; 312, line 26-27.) 
Jim Prentice would not even meet with Ms. Southworth. He 
would not even allow her to fill out an application for 
residency. He would not allow her to discuss the improvements 
she was going to make to the Mobile Home. As this Court stated 
in Qrtiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), there was "no substantial competent evidence" 
presented at trial "upon which a reasonable, fair jury could 
enter a finding" that Brookside's denial of Ms. Southworth's 
application for residency was not unreasonable. Id. at 1218 
(internal quotations, citation & footnote omitted). 
Brookside's manager refused to accept an application for 
residency from Ms. Southworth or even meet with her. Ms. 
Southworth tried to meet with Mr. Prentice to explain her 
financial status, but he refused to discuss the matter with her, 
telling her that her application, which she had not yet filled 
out, had been denied. She also had a list of improvements she 
wanted to discuss with Jim Prentice, the Park manager. However, 
45 
Prentice would not "give her the time of day." Under the Ortiz 
standard, "reasonable people would not differ" as to the 
unreasonableness of such behavior. Id. at 1216 (citations 
omitted) . 
Because the "great weight of the evidence" indicates that 
Brookside "unreasonably withheld" approval of Ms. Southworth's 
residency in violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code, 
the jury verdict should therefore be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM 
No legal basis exists for reversing the trial court's denial 
of plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees for 
successfully defending against Sam Peebles' counterclaim. A 
statutory or contractual basis must be asserted to recover costs 
and attorney's fees. See J.V, Hatch Constr, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 
P.2d 8, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that it "is well-
established . . . [that] attorney's fees are generally not 
awarded in Utah unless provided for by either statute or 
contract."). No such basis exists here, however. 
Sam Peebles' counterclaim arose out of Brookside's refusal 
to approve residency within the Park for Jake Grider, Marie 
Gibson and Jackie Southworth. In connection therewith, Sam 
Peebles alleged six causes of action: 1) breach of contract, 2) 
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 3) 
violation of section 57-16-4(4), 4) intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, 5) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and 6) promissory estoppel. 
A. Breach of Contract 
As to the claims for "breach of contract" and "breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," there is no 
contractual attorney's fees clause. Therefore, Brookside is not 
entitled to attorney's fees for defending against these two 
claims. 
B. Section 57-16-4 (4) 
Section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code provides that approval 
of a prospective purchaser may not be "unreasonably withheld" by 
a mobile home park. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-4(4) (Supp. 1999) . 
There is nothing in that section (or elsewhere)' that allows for 
an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party on a claim 
that a mobile home park "unreasonably withheld" approval of a 
prospective purchaser in violation of that section. 
C Interference with economic relations 
Sam Peebles also claimed that Brookside tortiously 
interfered with the prospective sale of his Mobile Home. This is 
a "tort" claim. There is no basis for the prevailing party to 
recover attorney's fees on this claim. 
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D. Infliction of emotional distress 
There is no basis for the prevailing party to recover 
attorney's fees under a claim for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Furthermore, in plaintiff's Motion for 
Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs, Brookside admits 
that it is not entitled to attorney's fees for successfully 
defending against this claim. (R. at 1148.) There is no 
conceptual difference between that counterclaim and the others. 
Having admitted below that it is not entitled to attorney's fee 
for defending part of the counterclaim, Brookside has admitted 
that it is not entitled to attorney's fees for defending any of 
the counterclaim since all of the counterclaims are 
indistinguishable for purpose of recovering attorney's fees. 
E. Promissory Estoppel 
Finally, there is no basis for the prevailing party to 
recover attorney's fees on a claim for promissory estoppel. 
Plaintiff argues that it is statutorily entitled to 
attorney's fees under Section 57-16-8. This is not so. Section 
57-16-8 of the Utah Code provides that " [i]f a resident elects to 
contest an eviction proceeding, . . . [t]he prevailing party is 
entitled to attorney's fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-8 (1994). 
By arguing that section 57-16-8 applies, Brookside concedes that 
Peebles is a "resident," and accordingly the court's directed 
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verdict in favor of defendants should be upheld and defendants 
should be awarded their court cost and attorney's fees. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, section 57-16-8 does not 
apply, by its terms, to any of the claims made under the 
counterclaim. Plaintiff relies on the following language from 
that section: "Upon final termination of the issues between the 
parties, the court shall order all amounts paid into court paid 
to the mobile home park." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-18 (1994) . 
However, the statute does not state that the "prevailing party" 
on those "issues" is entitled to attorney's fees. Rather, it 
only states that upon termination of the issues "all amounts paid 
into the court" shall be "paid to the mobile home park." 
Furthermore, as used in the sentence, the term "issues" relates 
to. issues in the "eviction proceeding," but not to those issues 
raised in plaintiff's counterclaim. 
Moreover, the counterclaim was not a defense to the eviction 
proceeding. The counterclaim was a completely different pleading 
than the answer. The counterclaim was filed approximately one 
year after the eviction proceeding commenced. If Sam Peebles had 
prevailed on the counterclaim, he would not have been entitled to 
recover his attorney's fees. There is simply no basis for 
plaintiff to recover its fees for successfully defending against 
the counterclaim. 
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Plaintiff is also not entitled to costs under Rule 54(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, where a 
defendant prevails on the complaint, defendant is the prevailing 
party for purposes of awarding costs, even though plaintiff 
prevails on the counterclaim: 
Suppose, for instance, a defendant presents 
counterclaims against the plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff loses on its claims, the defendant 
is the prevailing party, even if the success 
of the counterclaims is limited. If the 
defendant's counterclaims are completely 
unsuccessful, the plaintiff is the prevailing 
party as to those claims, but the court may 
still tax costs for those claims against the 
plaintiff in its discretion. 
10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET A L . , MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 5 4 . 1 0 1 [3] (3d e d . 
1999) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Terry Properties, Inc. v. 
Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (although 
defendant's counterclaims were defeated, district court did not 
err in taxing costs for those claims against plaintiff, since 
those claims never would have been asserted but for plaintiff's 
suit). Therefore, because plaintiff did not prevail on its First 
Amended Complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to any costs. 
In short, there is no legal basis for plaintiff to recover 
attorney's fees for successfully defending against any of the six 
claims under the counterclaim. Furthermore, since plaintiff did 
not prevail on the First Amended Complaint at trial, plaintiff is 
not entitled to costs under Rule 54(d). 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion for 
Costs and Attorney's Fees. Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code 
provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction 
proceeding, . . . [t]he prevailing party is . . . entitled to 
court costs and attorney's fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-8 (1994). 
As previously discussed (see Section II above), Sam Peebles 
was a "resident" as defined under section 57-16-1. Furthermore, 
this was clearly "an eviction proceeding." It makes no 
difference that Brookside brought the eviction proceeding under 
the Unlawful Detainer Act. The prayer for relief under the 
Amended Complaint requests "an order of the court evicting 
defendants from the Park and for a Writ of Restitution removing 
the Mobile Home from said premises and restoring possession of 
the same to the plaintiff." (R. at 7.) (Emphasis added). Thus, 
the action was an "eviction action" as defined by section 57-16-
8, and Sam Peebles is therefore entitled to his costs and 
attorney's fees under section 57-16-8. 
Defendants are also entitled to attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal for successfully defending the eviction action. Where the 
party below is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, that party 
is also entitled to attorney's fee on appeal. See, e.g., Living 
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Scriptures Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)("A 
party who was awarded attorney fees and costs at trial is also 
entitled to attorney fees and costs if that party prevails on 
appeal.") (Internal quotation & citation omitted). Thus, 
defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the 
trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in granting 
defendants' motion for reconsideration. This Court should also 
find that the trial court did not err in granting defendants' 
motion for directed verdict, nor did it err in denying 
plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. 
Additionally, this Court should overturn the jury verdict 
and find that Brookside's refusal to meet with or even accept an 
application for residency from Ms. Southworth is a per se 
violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code, which provides 
that approval of a prospective purchaser for residency may not be 
"unreasonably withheld." 
Finally, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial 
of defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees for successfully 
defending the eviction action, and remand this case for a 
determination consistent therewith, including a determination of 
defendants' attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending 
the eviction action. 
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Appendice "A" 
"Utah Certificate of title" showing Harold Boyd 
Peebles and Samuel Peebles as owners of the Mobile 
Home. 
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a 
A p p e n d i c e WB" 
"Assignment of Leases and D e p o s i t s " d a t e d 
December 9, 1994 
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND DEPOSITS 
THIS ASSIGNMENT is made and entered into on the y * day of 
December, 1994, by and between BROOKSIDE ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited 
partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Assignor", and MARIE M. 
GLOVER and ALAN & BONNIE GLOVER TRUST, a general partnership 
comprised of the MARIE M. GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 30, 
1983 and the ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated 
Nov. 30, 1983, hereinafter referred to as "Assignee". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Assignor is the owner of that certain real property 
and improvements located thereon known as Brookside Mobile Home 
Park located at 8155 South 1700 West, West Jordan, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, (hereinafter^ 
referred to as the "Property"); and 
WHEREAS, Assignor has agreed to sell the Property to Assignee,-
all in accordance with the terms and conditions of a Commercial 
Purchase Agreement, with counter-offer dated August 22, 1994, as 
amended, made and entered into by and between Assignor, as Seller, 
and Assignee, as Buyer, and to assign to Assignee all of its right, 
title and interest in and to those certain leases, rental agree-
ments, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with 
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property, 
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
the "Leases"), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more 
particularly described on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorpo-
rated herein by this reference; and 
WHEREAS, the Assignee desires to acquire from the Assignor all 
of the right, title and interest of the Assignor in and to the 
Leases, all in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter 
set forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows: 
1. Assignor, in consideration of the payment of Ten Dollars 
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby bargains, 
sells, assigns, transfers and sets over unto Assignee, all of its 
right, title and interest in and to the Leases, hereby constituting 
glovlcasasg (dkp) 
Assignee as the true and lawful attorney in fact for the Assignor 
irrevocably to adopt and pursue all lawful ways and means to 
collect, renew, enforce, recover and reduce to possession and 
ownership the Leases and rights hereby transferred. 
2. Assignor hereby warrants to Assignee and its successors 
and assigns that Assignor is hereby selling, assigning and 
transferring to Assignee on the date hereof good and marketable 
title to the Leases, free and clear of all liens, security 
interests, encumbrances and rights of others. Assignor covenants 
that it will warrant and defend such title against all claim and 
demands whatsoever. 
3. Immediately after the execution and delivery of this 
Assignment, Assignor, agrees to deliver to Assignee (or its 
designee) all Leases, including but not limited to cash or cer-
tified funds in the amount of the security and other deposits. 
Nothing herein shall preclude Assignor and Assignee from crediting 
such funds as part of the closing relative to the sale and purchase 
of the Property; provided, however, in the event of such procedure, 
said security and other deposits shall be shown as separate debits 
and credits upon settlement statements to be signed by the parties. 
4. In consideration of the Assignor executing and delivering 
this Agreement, Assignee covenants with the Assignor as follows: 
a. That the Assignee will duly keep, observe and perform all 
of the terms, conditions and provisions of the Leases 
after this date that are to be kept, observed and 
performed by Assignor. 
b. That the Assignee will save and hold harmless the Assig-
nor of and from any and all actions, suits, costs, 
damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason 
of an act or omission of the Assignee. 
5. Assignor shall indemnify Assignee against all claims, with 
respect to: 
a. the discharge and performance of any duties and obliga-
tions to be performed or discharged by the lessor under 
the Leases prior to the effective date hereof; 
b. the discharge and performance of any duties and obliga-
tions to be performed or discharged by the lessor after 
Closing if such duty or obligation arose prior to Closing 
or is a continuing duty or obligation of Assignor by 
glovieas^sg (dkp) 2 
reason of Assignor's failure to perform or discharge said 
duty or obligation prior to Closing; or 
c. any matter arising from the breach of a representation, 
warranty or covenant of Assignor under the Purchase 
Agreement or for which Assignor is obligated to indemnify 
Assignee under the Real Estate Sales Contract. 
6. Assignor acknowledges—thafe—Acoignce—shall—have—no 
obligation t-e collect delinquent rentals attributable to the Leases 
and unpaid as of the effective date hereof and in the event that 
any such delinquent rentals attributable to the Leases are 
collected the same shall be deemed the sole property of Apoignoc,» 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their 
hands and seals the day and year first above written. 
ASSIGNOR: 
BROOKSIDE ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah limited partnership 
By its sole General Parnters, REC 
corporation 
Richard E. Chipman, Presic sident 
[signatures continuing on next page] 
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ASSIGNEE: 
MARIE M. GLOVER and ALAN & BONNIE 
GLOVER TRUST, a general partnership 
comprised of the MARIE M. GLOVER 
REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 30, 1983 
and the ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A. 
GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 
30, 1983 
By one of its General partners, 
MARIE M. GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST 
dated Nov. 30, 1983 
By QM*,%4A<«*' 
Alan H. Glover, Trustee 
By Qrto 
Bonne A. Glover, Trustee 
And by its remaining General 
Partner, ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A. 
GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 
30, 1983 
By _ C ^ " * 
Alan H. Glover, Trustee 
By q $ w J& itl/ste. 
Bonne A. Glover, Trustee 
glovleas.asg (dkp) 
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Appendice xyC" 
Samuel E. Peebles' check #4765 made payable to 
and endorsed by Brookside. 
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Appendice "D" 
"Notice to Pay Rent or Qui t . " 
NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT 
TO: s&n p£E&Uf£ . 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the rent on the premises located at BROOKSIDE 
MOBILE HOME PARK, NO. , which you now possess as a tenant, is past due. 
You must, within three days after service of this Notice upon you, pay the 
rent now due and owing on the premises, OR, in the alternative, you must, within 
such period of three days, vacate the premises and deliver possession to your 
landlord, BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, LTD., or its duly authorized agent. The 
amount of rent now due ^ d p*M]g) for the months of kj£ffip^ /3Z3L. __, and 
is $ ^?f' 3 together with late charges in the amount of 
t^WDiO^ , and other fees and charges including pet fees of $ service 
fees of * //>. n ft and totaling $ ^ 7 ^ ^ 
In the event that you should cure the above default within the time period 
allowed, but in the future at any time should default in the payment of rent when 
due, violate any of the Rules and Regulations of Brookside Mobile Home Park, or 
breach any provision of the Lease Agreement, such repeated default and/or viola-
tion will result in immediate termination of your lease without any further peri-
od to cure such default or violations and eviction proceedings will be initiated 
immediately. 
In the event of your failure to comply with the above Notice or to vacate 
the premises within the specified period, you will be unlawfully detaining the 
premises, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-10, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended), you will be liable for treble damages for such unlawful 
detainer, and an action will be commenced against you to evict you from the prem-
ises and to take judgment against you for the rent accrued and for three times 
the damages assessed by the court for unlawful detainer, together with the costs 
of legal action. 
This Notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tion 57-16-5, Section 57-16-6, Section 78-36-3, and Section 78-36-6, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). 
/ / day of pzcem&EZ . i$9£. DATED zhis 
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOM£_PARK, LTD. 
a UtalTNLimited Pe 
Duly Authorized Agent 
55 South Redwood Road 
st Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone (801) 561-5181 
200082 
pp..... 'IP W' k 
Appendice E: 
Brookside's ledger register indicating various 
rent payments made to Brookside for lot #100. 
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Appendice "F" 
"Notice to Quit" from Brookside to Sam Peebles." 
EXHIBIT ^ 
NOTICE TO QUIT 
TO: SAM PEEBLES 
12067 SOUTH 2240 WEST 
RIVERTON, UTAH 84065 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you must, within five (5) days after 
service of this Notice upon you, remove the mobile home purportedly 
owned by you from the premises located at 8155 South 1700 West, No. 
100, West Jordan, Utah and deliver possession of said premises to 
ics owner, Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized 
agent. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. is the owner of said prop-
erty pursuant to a purchase agreement dated August 22, 19 94. 
In the event of your failure to comply with the above notice 
to vacate the premises within the specified period, you will be 
unlawfully detaining the premises, and in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 78-36-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), you will be 
liable for treble damages for such unlawful detainer, and an action 
will be commenced against you to evict you from the premises and to 
take judgment against you for three times the damages assessed by 
the Court for unlawful detainer, together with costs of legal 
action. 
This notice is given and served in accordance with the pro-
visions of Sections 78-36-3 and 78-36-6, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
DATED this // day of April, 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
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deemed :o h<ive been waived H o w e ^ r , this w^ 
ent of ail Se<e- D-sdos 
•f- . -n \A sailer 'sgarding a Seller Oisclciure or the Proco'Tv in? 
• i ^ i i . t ' approved or waived by Buyer 
i' :,a'jn se/en calendar days after receipt o* the or./ectiyn$ to 'eso i - t Buyer's e j e c t i o n s SeLerm.gy bu 
it 9uye< s objections are not resolved within tne seven calendar CA,S. Buyer may void this Contact b> 
-06ic not attect those 't. 
Fay« 1 ol 2 pagoi Sellar'i Inilinl*. 
.C, i*P 
warranted 
<«. tiltlt 
. / " — « « » ^ e o3 covenants of this Contract 
-. -r . v . « u w^r., mucnues . rm, offer .3 made subject to. APfAAt/fif* A£ JJ/Qffltf/b? ffft/U/r PAfij£_ 
The teyns of anached Addendum ¥ _ / _ . . — are incorporated Into this Contract by this reference. 7 ^ ^ 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Sellers warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following 
10.1 When seller deliver* possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings 
10 2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixture* heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces tn working order; 
10 3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller 
10 4 Seller w.ll deliver possession of (he Property to Buyer with any private well or sept.c tank serving the Property m working order and in compliance 
with governmental regulations; 
10 5 Seller will ba responsible lor repairing any of Seller's moving*related damage to the Property, 
10.6 Ai Closing, Seller w.ll br.ng current an financial obligations encumbering the Proporty which are assumed .n writing by Buyer and will discharge ail 
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and 
10.7 As of Closing. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been resolved 
11. VERIFICATION CF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to 
determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10 2,10 3 and 10 A are In the warranted condition and to verify .terns included in Section 
1 1 are present on the Properly If any item .5 not in the warranted condition, Seller will correct, repair or replace It as necessary or. with the consent 0 i 
Buyer, escrow en amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement The Buyer's failure to conduci a "walk-through" Inspection or t0 claim 
during the walk-through" inspection mat the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1. or la not in the condition warranted in Section 
10. shall not constitute a waiver I Buyer ol Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of the warranties contained In Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TR A N S A L HON. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall ba made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial 
^iterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
U AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Se: jr is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate ot other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants h., or hor authority to do so df\d to bind Buyer or Seller. 
14. CO'ipu r E CONTRACT ihif instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract 
between the parlies and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings *" contracts between the 
panies. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The pertier ^gree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the d>s(. v! or ol the Earnest 
Monty Deposit, the breach or terminal of this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to meomiion m accordance 
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer .Ik 'ediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall Include representations made by th« 
partes y Broker or other person nr en »n connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect of the Property to which this Contract 
pern, nciuding withou4. limitation, allegations of concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and/or fraud Each party agrees to bear its own costs of 
me • ..„0n. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies 
a> tn&ble under this Contract shall apply Nothing in this SeCjjOn \ 5 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation By 
marking this box §^and adding their initials, the B u y e r f ^ j ^ - a o d the Seller ( ). agree that mediation under this Section 15 Is not mandatory, but 15 
optional upon agreement of all parties 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Setter may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money Deposit 
and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights if Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may e«ect to either accept from Seller as 
liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or to sue Seller for specific performance end'or damages. If Buyer elects to accept th« 
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay tne liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy th« 
panies intend that tne remedy shall he exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common taw. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. <n any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall ba entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The E$rn*$t Money DepotK shall not be rehased unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section 8.3 01 Section 
15. (b} separate written agreement ot the parties; or (c) court order. 
18. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing 
20. RISK OF LG8S. All risk of loss Or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by alt parties 
Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) OOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, 
shall be the same as delivery of an original U the transaction involves multiple Duyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterpa; '» 
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an oHer or counteroffer of the other (a) signs the offer or counter where noted 
to indicate acceptance, and (b) communicates to the other parry or the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the-Property on the above terms and conditions if Seller does not accept this ofier b> 
. C AM C PM Mountain Time _ . this offer shall lapse; and Hie Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
Deposit to Bayer t /*"* f 
' ^ ^ (6fter Oatl) (Buyer's Signature) 
-^^C^a-fyN < r v
 t " % D & 6 t = ^ — - ^ ' 6"*^fh* above date shall be the OHer Reference Date. 
(OHer Oate) 
(Notice Address) (Phone) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
D Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
D Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. (Seller's Initials) - (Dale) (Time) 
-QXounUr OHer: Seller presents for^&^er's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the attached 
/Counter Offer U _ / 
-^ r 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all * matures. (One of the following s'rematlves must therefore 
be completed) 
A. bf i acknowledge receipt ot^JWal copy of the foregoing ( y4jj?a\  f t  f i  Contract bearing a>htfwture'""N A t f 
~ ~~ 6StJ ~~— uai« 
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on .,_..,. . 19 _..._.._ by 
certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer, Sent by 
Seller's Initials ( ) Date Buyer's Initials 
THIS roeU AP*«OV£l; Sr THE UTAH REAL CSTArt COMMISSION AND THE OFFlCS OF THF UTAH ATT 
Pa«t 2 of 2 paqe* 
Of£l*Y OfWRAl, JUNE, 1101 
1 1 - 1 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT f*£% 
I g j i B B B Thi» l i • i»^tly binding Contnct Utah Stjrte urw requires that Notnsed reilMtateig*mtUMmU form but th« Buyci md tfM 4n4 i , fce_e_l 
REALTOR* , ^ n y ^ ^ ,n WTtttng ,0 - h - f Qf ^ ^ p^Uloes of this lorm. If you desire legsi of tax edvk* consult your attorney or ft Mm it """°"*? 
THIS SELLER FINANCINOADDENDUM (the "Addendum") la made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC ) with an Offer 
Reference Data J ,feflf<?A~ \93&*- between ^ ^ ^ / E , J2>. ^ r c T ^ ^ ^ Z ^ L - _ _ as Buyer 
a n d
 - ffl * ' f/ r*fi nf^J* T*_^  aa Seller The terms ol this Addendum are 
hereby mcorporaied as pan of ma R£Pf end 1o the extent these terms conflict with or modify any provisions of the RFPC 'he terms a* (his Adien j ,m 
shall control AH other erms of the REPC not modified by this Addendum shall remain the same 
1 CREDIT DOCUMENTS Seller s e/ienston of credit to Buyer ohall be evidenced by # Note and Doed of Tru6t L Note and All Inclusive Deed of Trust 
r Other ^ 
2 CREDIT TERMS The larms of the credit documents referred to in Sectiop 1 above are as follows ^ 
S / ^ ^ft@ principal amount of the note (the "Note"), Interest at _ _ £ _ % per annum payable at approximately $ pW?'*-" per A4f) The 
enure unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due In $1+ morths from date of the Note First payment due X&t^ /~" / * ? ? / 
Add'tir na principal payments balloon payments or other terms as follows ^^ *• J / < , ^Q^ 
-^ & Ak^TtAJWl^lffi&iiZzfaijfy 
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this Addendum will contain a due on-sale clause in favor o< Seller Buyer]?' wiliVwill not provide Seller 
dt Closing witr s title policy Insuring Seller In the amount of the Note Sailer agrees to provide to Buyer at Closing u) an amonliatlon schedule 
- 1 on if * * d terms and (n) a written disclosure of the total Interest Buyer will pay to matunty of the Note 
3 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS in addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be responsible tor (l) property ia*es < I, 
nomeowr srs association dues (it ) special assessments, and (Iv) hazard insurance premiums on the Proporty These obligations will be patd ;><diractiy 
to Set*- Fs^row Ageni on a monthly basis _ directly to the appMcabte county treasurer association and insurance company «® required by those ent ties 
4 PAYMENT Buyer s payments under Secf/ona 2 and 3 above will be made to O Seller 5J(an Escrow Agent It an Escrow Agent 
*"72> JPtr.-/J4m££) . will act aa Escrow Agent §nd will be responsible for disbursing payments on the underlymg mortgage and in Ihe 
Set •( ( r» ot setting up and m« ntaming ihe escrow account shall be paid by Q Buyer H Salla&slspllt evenly between the parties 
5 LATF PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT Any payment not made withm / & days after it is due Is subject to a late charge ot $ /<£ or Ald£t*° 
r i Ir^ e nslailrreni due Amounts in default ehall bear nterest at a rale of /^D **<. per annum All or part of tf e pnnc pal bianco on the Kioto ma^ ne 
paid prior to matur ry without penalty 
6 DUE-GN SALE This transaction i$ subject to Buyers approval of the terms of any underlying loan «is provided In Section 3 of the REPC Buyer 
acknowledges that any undertymq loan on the Property may contain a due-on*sale clause which requires th«- ,nder s consent to this transaction If the 
lender does not consent to this transaction and calls the loan immediately due Buyer agrees to discharge (S«, ndertyinrj loan as required by the lender 
1 i f even' Seller s remaining equity shall h* paid as provided In the credit documents 
7 BUYER 8 DISCLOSURES Buyer has provided to Seller as a required part of this Addendum the attached Buyer Financial Information Shaei • 
PART B Buyer X w i l i f will not provide Seller w»lh copies of IRS returns for tho two preceding tax years Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contaf i 
Buyer s current employur for v«ni»cHtion of employment as represented uy Buyer m the Uuyer Financial Information Sheet 
a SLLLER APPROVAL Within the t me referenced in Section Tot the REPC, Buyer shall provide to Seder al Buyer s expanse a current c edit report 
on Buyer from a consumer credit repomng agency Seller may use the information contained In the credit report and the information referenced n 
Serf/on 7 of this Addondum (collectively referred to as Ihe "Buyer Disclosures*) lo evaluate Ihe credit worthiness of Buyer Seller agrees, to nwiniam 
confidential all information contained m Ihe Buyer Disclosures 
i 1 Seller Review W thin the lime period allowed In Section H 1 ol the HhPC Seller thali revtov"* the t edit report and the Buyai Disclosures to 
determine it in Seller $ 6ole discretion the content of ihe credit report, and the Buyer Disclosures Is acceptable If the content ol the credit repon or the 
Buytr Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller Seller may elect to either (I) provide written ob|ections to Buyer as provided in Section 8 2 of this 
Addendum or (i) immediately void the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer within the time referenced in Section 8 1 of the RCPC Thp 
Brokerage -upon receipt of a copy o' Seller a wrttten notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement ol 
any further written authorization Irom Soller 
8 2 Seller Objections If S^iiar anas nnt immBdlately void the REPC as provided above. Seller may within the time penod allowed in Section 8 f of ihe 
REPC provide buyer with written objections Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days after Buyers receipt of the objections to resolve Sellers 
obieciions Buyer ma/ put shall not be required to resolve Seller s objections If Seller s objections are not resolved within the seven calendar days Seller 
may void 'he REPC by providing written notice to Buyer within the same seven calendar days The Brokerage upon recelot of a copy of Sella's written 
not rp nf ran^piiation shall return »o Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the iequipment of any further written authorization from Seller 
8 3 Failure to Object if Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit repon or a Buyer Disclosure within the lime p nod 
a lowed m Section 8 1 of the REPC or if Seller does not void the REPC as provided in Sections 8 lot 8 2 of this Addendum any objections to the * red« 
rypon and Buyer Disclosures will be daamad approy^c^waivedby Seller / 
Z Seller ""• Buver shall have until _ _ _ 2 L L J A . M U P M. MourtuwfTime „ . 13 _ to accept these terms in a t ordance with Section
 t j 
#3 q< 
C Buyer O Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTIOI^OUNTER OFFER 
UHE< K ONF 
;*2. 'CCEPTANCE ~ Seller P Bp f ^ rweoy accepts thestj terms ?_____. 
Date Tlma 
fTiuyer D Seller Signature r j a l e r ' m * 
C REJECTION n Seller i J Buyer rejects these terrr 
(Initials) (Uau*» ( r , m 0 ) 
C COUNTER OFFER Z Seller r" Buyer presents as a counter ofter the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer • 
. / \sssvi* i t n v r r c n ff _ , 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date 
, including all addenda and counter offers,, 
between , .>(% f ds r * Jh^ . L< /A+£7!&* Cf^^CS
 as Buyer, 
and > ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ i ^ £ -f/*C<£&<><' ', as Seller' 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the 
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same 
(3T fi^^udiA^ To X - ^ c j 7Jbed? t^cy***^ AC*J£JA^< ^'^T^l<^j 
S>) j ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ' Z ^ U^yt^^n^^ X^t^>c^i^^Jl^ fQrtjPjuu^f (1 * i * ^ 
V<u 
( ] Seller ( J Buyer shall have until^LL- [ 1AM { ] PM Mountain Time, , 19 , to accept 
these termsM accordancajwith- Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse 
[ I Buyer X_>eller Signature Date 
[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE 
f J Acceptance f J Seller ( J Buyer hereby accepts these terms. 
{ ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature Date Time 
( ) Buyer [ J Seller Signature Date Time 
( 1 Rejection ( ] Sellei ( ] Buyer rejects these terms 
(Initials) (Date) (Time) 
[ ] Counter Offer [ ] Seller ( ] Buyer presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer # . 
Appendicr UH 
Jury's response to questions raised at t r i a l . 
INTERROGATOR! i 
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that prior to J3I ii id! v A 199' 
when Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, that Defei claiii i t: Sc 
Peebles had a written, lease or rental agreement with the Park for the lease --i 
Space too. 100? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question A above is "Yes/" please answer Question B If yoi ir 
answer to Question A is "No " go to Interrogatory III, 
B. Do you find by e preponderance of the evidence that Sam, Peebles' lease or 
rental agreement was surrendered?" 
No ^ 
If your answer to Question B above is "Yes/" go to Interrogatoi\r III If your answer 
to Qi lestion B is "No," please answer Question C. 
C. Do you find by a preponderance ol the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home 
Pai k 1 td assumed Sam Peebles'' tease or rental agreement? 
v 
Yes No ^_ 
Please proceed to Interrogatory No. II. 
Jury For 
INTERROGATORY II 
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd unreasonably withheld approval of one or more prospective purchasers 
of Sam Peebles' mobile home, to become a resident in the Park? 
Yes No 
If your answer to QuestiorO^above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory W. If 
your answer to Question^^bove is "Yes," please answer Question B below. 
A 
B. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside's withholding 
of approval of one or more of the prospective purchasers of Sam Peebles' 
mobile home to become a resident in the Park was the cause of any damage or 
injury to Sam Peebles? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question C above is "Yes," please proceed to Interrogatory^?. If 
your answer to Question C above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory III. 
Dated this day of October, 1998. 
/\s\ \ 
IN i t h R u G A i u h Y III 
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd. unreasonably withheld its consent to one or more prospective 
purchasers of Sam Peebles' mobile home, to become a resident in the Park? 
Yes No \ 
If your answv. ^ Question A above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV. if 
your answer to Question A above is "Yes," please answer Question B below. 
B. . Do you fir id by a preponderance of ti ie e\ idence that Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd intentionally interfered witl i Sain Peebles' prospective economic 
relations by disapproving the prospective purchasers of Sam Peebles' mobile 
home, as a resident in the Pai k? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question B above is "Yes/" please answer Question C below If yo«w 
answer to Question B above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV. 
Do you find by a prepowloi "K,u n! the evidence that Brookside Mobile Humr 
Park, Ltd's intentional interference with Sam Peebles' prospective economic 
relations was for an improper purpose or by improper means? 
Yes No 
If your answer to Question C above is "Y es," please answer Question U bd " 
your answer to Question C above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV 
P Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd's interference with Sam Peebles' prospective economic relations was 
the cause of any damage or injury to Defendant Sam Peebles? 
Yes No 
If • 1,  i :iur answer to Question D above is "Yes," please proceed to InterrogatoryIV 
y : i iiir answer to Question D above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory \\ f 
